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1. Introduction
Consider a stochastic processX on a state space E and the problem of finding a stopping
time τ that maximizes
Jτ (x) := Ex(f(Xτ )) + g (Ex(h(Xτ ))) , X0 = x
where f, h : E → R and g : R→ R.
(1.1)
This problem is in general time-inconsistent in the sense that if a stopping rule is optimal
for a particular initial value x then it is generally not optimal for x′ 6= x; the reason being
that g may be non-linear. Note that we may formulate both mean-variance and variance
stopping problems as special cases of (1), see Section 6.
The consistent planning approach to time-inconsistent problems pioneered by Strotz and
Selten [44, 45, 47] corresponds — in a stopping problem context — to viewing (1) from
the perspective of a person who decides when to stop X but whose preferences, due to
the time-inconsistency, change as X evolves; and therefore (1) is viewed as an intrap-
ersonal non-cooperative stopping game. The approach is formalized by formulating an
appropriate mathematical definition of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We refer to
e.g. [8, 13, 15, 38] for more comprehensive interpretations of the equilibrium approach to
time-inconsistent problems.
The present paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.1 we motivate the study of time-
inconsistent stopping by formulating three types of problems that are studied in finance
and economics and review some of the related literature. In Section 2 we definemixed and
pure stopping strategies and the equilibrium. In Section 2.1 we show that the definition of
equilibrium coincides with standard optimality when the problem is time-consistent (i.e.
when g = 0 in (1)). In Section 3 we derive several results with necessary and sufficient
equilibrium conditions including a verification theorem. In Section 4 we provide a fixed
point problem characterization of equilibrium and related equilibrium existence results.
In Section 5 we adapt and study the notion of amyopic adjustment process. We also define
and study different notions equilibrium stability. In Sections 6.1 and 6.2 the developed
theory is applied to mean-variance and variance optimization. In Section 6.1.2 we show
that an equilibrium does not necessarily exist and if it does then it is not necessarily
unique. In Section 7 we discuss the framework of the present paper in relation to the
literature. The appendix contains some technical results.
1.1. Time-inconsistency in economics & related literature
In order to motivate the study of time-inconsistent stopping problems in general we here
present three simple examples which correspond to time-inconsistent problems com-
monly studied in finance and economics. Similar presentations are contained in [13, 15]
while [8, 38] present these problems in a regular stochastic control framework. Note that
of the three kinds of problems described in this section only mean-variance optimization
can directly be studied within the framework of the present paper. In [15] we develop a
general framework for the equilibrium approach to time-inconsistent stopping problems
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of the type in the present paper for a one-dimensional diffusion. We remark that time-
inconsistent problems can also be studied using the pre-commitment approach and the
dynamic optimality approach. In the context of the present paper the pre-commitment
approach corresponds to maximizing (1) for a particular x. The dynamic optimality ap-
proach was invented in [41, 42] and corresponds to choosing a strategy that is optimal
with respect to all present states.
Mean-variance optimization: In a stopping problem context the mean-variance prob-
lem can be motivated with the following example. Suppose an investor wants to sell an
asset whose price follows a stochastic process X . Suppose the investor wants, for any
particular x, to use a selling strategy, i.e. a stopping time τ , that maximizes
Ex(Xτ )− γVarx(Xτ ),
for a fixed parameter γ > 0 corresponding to risk aversion. The interpretation is that the
investor wants a large expected payoff but is averse to risk measured in terms of selling
price variance. Amean-variance stopping problem is studied in Section 6.1. In [15, Section
4.2] a mean-variance stopping problem for a geometric Brownian motion is studied using
the equilibrium approach. In [4] a mean-standard deviation and mean-variance stopping
problem for a discrete time Markov chain is studied using the equilibrium approach. In
[41] a mean-variance stopping problem for a geometric Brownian motion is studied using
a precommitment approach and the dynamic optimality approach. We note that there is
a large literature on mean-variance optimization especially for regular stochastic control
(often corresponding to dynamic asset portfolio selection), see e.g. [5, 6, 9, 15, 16, 18, 26,
35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 49, 50, 52, 55].
Endogenous habit formation: An example of this kind of problem is a version of the
asset selling problem introduced above corresponding to
Ex(F (Xτ , x)),
where F (·, x) is a utility function parametrized by x. The interpretation is that the cur-
rent price of the asset determines the utility function of the investor. In [13] we develop
a general framework for the equilibrium approach to time-inconsistent stopping prob-
lems of the endogenous habit formation type for a continous time Markov process and
in [13, Example 5.8.] an endogenous habit formation asset selling problem is studied.
Endogenous habit formation is also studied in e.g. [7, 19, 21, 54].
Non-exponential discounting: An example of this kind of problem is the version of
the asset selling problem corresponding to
Et,x(δ(τ − t)F (Xτ )),
where δ(·) is a non-exponential discounting function (i.e a non-increasing function tak-
ing values in [0, 1] with δ(0) = 1). Non-exponential discounting stopping problems are
studied in [3, 28, 32, 33]. They can also be studied within the continuous time framework
of [13]. Non-exponential discounting is also studied in e.g. [1, 2].
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Now we mention some other related problems studied in the recent literature. A time-
inconsistent stopping problem under model ambiguity is studied using the equilibrium
approach in [30]. Conditional optimal stopping is studied using the equilibrium approach
in [39]. Precommitment and naive strategies for optimal exit times for gambling are stud-
ied in [27]. Optimal stopping under probability distortion is studied with a precommit-
ment approach in [51]. In [29] a general framework for naive and equilibrium strategies
for time-inconsistent stopping problems for a diffusion is developed and applied to prob-
ability distortion. The principle of smooth pasting for a particular problem is considered
in [48]. [20] studies a framework under general preference structure. A version of the
classical dividend problem with a time-inconsistent restriction is studied in [14] using
both the precommitment and consistent planning approach.
Further references to the literature are found throughout the paper. A recent survey of
time-inconsistent stochastic control is [53].
2. Problem formulation
We consider the time-inconsistent stopping problem (1) for a discrete time strong time-
homogeneous Markov chain X = {Xn}, n ∈ N0, taking values in a finite state space
E with N elements. We also consider a stochastic process {Yn}, n ∈ N0, where each
Yn is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of X and of every Yk, k 6= n. We
denote by Px the measure under whichX0 = x ∈ E a.s. The associated expectations are
denoted by Ex.
As a notational convenience we consider an ordering of the state space E and identify
N -dimensional vectors, for instance p, with functions on the state space, i.e.
p =
(
px1 ,px2 , ...,pxN−1 ,pxN
)T
= (px)x∈E .
Definition 2.1 (Mixed stopping strategies). A vector p ∈ [0, 1]N is said to be a mixed
(Markov) stopping strategy and
τp := min{n ≥ 0 : Yn ≤ pXn}
is said to be a mixed (Markov) strategy (profile) stopping time.
Note that τp is a stopping time with respect to the filtration σ(X0, ...,Xn, Y0, ..., Yn),
n ∈ N0.
Definition 2.2 (Pure stopping strategies). A mixed stopping strategy p is said to be a
pure stopping strategy if p ∈ {0, 1}N .
Remark 2.3 (Interpretation). For a mixed stopping strategy p and any n the conditional
probability of stopping X at n, before having observed Yn, given that X has not been
stopped before n, is pXn . In this sense a stopping strategy p corresponds to using the
random variable Yn as a randomization device for the stopping decision made at n. Note
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that the randomization device can be interpreted as flipping a biased coin at each n and
stopping at n if the outcome is, say, heads, where the probability of heads is py if the
observed state is Xn = y. For a pure stopping strategy the conditional probability of
stoppingX at n given thatX has not been stopped before n is either one or zero; and in
this sense the decision to stop or not at n depends only on the payoff relevant quantity
Xn without randomization. For a more thorough description of the game theory terms
used in this section in another time-inconsistent stopping context see [13].
Remark 2.4. Note that p is a complete specification of the strategies of all players in the
game and that p is in this sense a strategy profile, although we refer to p as a stopping
strategy to be more in line with the existing literature.
Since the distribution of τp is determined by p we typically perform the analysis of the
present paper from the viewpoint of stopping strategies p. Hence, instead of Jτp(x) we
write Jp(x), cf. (1).
Definition 2.5 (Equilibrium). A stopping strategy pˆ is said to be a (subgame perfectNash)
equilibrium if
Jpˆ(x) ≥ qf(x) + (1− q)Ex
(
EX1(f(Xτpˆ))
)
+ g
(
qh(x) + (1− q)Ex
(
EX1(h(Xτpˆ))
))
, for all q ∈ [0, 1] and all x ∈ E.
(EqI)
The equilibrium is said to be pure if pˆ is pure. If pˆ is an equilibrium then τpˆ is said to be
the (corresponding) equilibrium stopping time and Jpˆ is said to be the (corresponding)
equilibrium value function.
Remark 2.6 (Interpretation). The interpretation of the expression in the right hand side
of (EqI) — or equivalently of K(x, q, pˆ) see (EqII)–(EqIV) below — is that it is the value
obtained at xwhen stopping at xwith probability q given that the strategy pˆ is used sub-
sequently. The interpretation of the expression in the left hand side of (EqI)–(EqIV) is that
it is the value obtained at x when using the strategy pˆ given that pˆ is used subsequently.
The interpretation of an equilibrium pˆ is therefore that, for each x, there is the possibility
to deviate from pˆ at x in the sense of using any other biased coin — cf. q in (EqI) — to
determine whether to stopX at the present time or not; but that such a deviation is never
preferred to using pˆx given that pˆ is used at all subsequent dates.
This paper is devoted to the question of how to find equilibria as defined above. Through-
out the paper we suppose the following assumptions hold:
Assumption 2.7. The function g : R→ R in (1) is continous.
Assumption 2.8. X is an absorbing Markov chain; that is, for each X0 = x ∈ E, there is
(at least) one absorbing state inE thatX reaches with positive probability in a finite number
of steps.
We use the convention
f(Xτ ) := limn→∞ f(Xn) and h(Xτ ) := limn→∞ h(Xn) on {τ =∞},
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where the limits exist due to Assumption 2.8, and the notation
φp(x) := Ex(f(Xτp)) and ψp(x) := Ex(h(Xτp)), (2.1)
which we note implies that
Jp(x) = φp(x) + g
(
ψp(x)
)
.
We remark that if px = 0 for each x ∈ E then τp = ∞ a.s. meaning that X is never
stopped. However, in this case X eventually reaches an absorbing state by Assumption
2.8 and therefore stops in this sense. We remark the related fact that φp and ψp are
independent of the value of px whenever x is an absorbing state.
We also use the notation
K(x, q,p)
:= qf(x) + (1− q)Ex
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
qh(x) + (1− q)Ex
(
ψp(X1)
))
.
(2.2)
We now provide three equivalent equilibrium definitions that will be used in the sequel.
Proposition 2.9. Each one of the following conditions is equivalent to the equilibrium con-
dition (EqI):
φpˆ(x) + g
(
ψpˆ(x)
)
≥ K(x, q, pˆ), for all q ∈ [0, 1] and all x ∈ E. (EqII)
φpˆ(x) + g
(
ψpˆ(x)
)
= max
q∈[0,1]
K(x, q, pˆ), for all x ∈ E. (EqIII)
pˆx ∈ argmax
q∈[0,1]
K(x, q, pˆ), for all x ∈ E. (EqIV)
Proof. Use the notation (2) and (2) to see that the first result holds. The second and third
results follow from the first result and the observation that if we set q = pˆx in (EqII) then
equality is attained, cf. Lemma A.1.
Remark 2.10. It should be possible to relax Assumptions 2.7 and 2.8 at the cost of increas-
ing the amount of technical details. We have chosen not to do so in order to focus on the
main ideas and not overburden the presentation.
2.1. The time-consistent case
If we consider a standard stopping problem, corresponding to maximization for (1) with
g = 0, then an equilibriumstopping time has the desirable property of being characterized
as an — in the usual sense — optimal stopping time:
Theorem 2.11. Suppose g = 0. Then, τpˆ is an equilibrium stopping time for (1) if and only
if τpˆ is an optimal stopping time for (1).
Proof. g = 0 implies that the equilibrium condition (EqI) can be written as
Jpˆ(x) ≥ qf(x) + (1− q)Ex
(
Jpˆ(X1)
)
, for all q ∈ [0, 1] and all x ∈ E,
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or equivalently as
Jpˆ(x) ≥ max{f(x),Ex
(
Jpˆ(X1)
)
}, for all x ∈ E.
We find that Jpˆ(x) is an equilibrium value function if and only if (i) Jpˆ(x) is excessive
for X , (ii) Jpˆ(x) majorizes f(x), and (iii) Jpˆ(x) = Ex(f(Xτpˆ)); i.e. if and only if Jpˆ(x)
is the optimal value function of the problem (1) with g = 0 (by well-known results from
the general theory of optimal stopping, see e.g. [46]).
3. Necessary and sufficient equilibrium conditions
It is instructive to note that the right side of the equality in (EqIII), or equivalently (EqIV),
is for each fixed x and pˆ an elementary optimization problem of a function [0, 1] → R,
cf. (2); which in particular can be written as
max
q∈[0,1]
{qc1 + (1− q)c2 + g (qc3 + (1− q)c4)},
where c1, ..., c4 are constants (depending on x and pˆ). Using this observation we imme-
diately obtain:
Theorem 3.1.
• Suppose g in (1) is differentiable. Then, a necessary condition for a stopping strategy
pˆ to be an equilibrium is that, for each x ∈ E, the following inequalities hold and (at
least) one of them holds with equality:
φpˆ(x) + g
(
ψpˆ(x)
)
≥ f(x) + g(h(x)) (3.1)
φpˆ(x) + g
(
ψpˆ(x)
)
≥ Ex
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
+ g
(
Ex
(
ψpˆ(X1)
))
(3.2)
|f(x)− Ex
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
+ g′
(
pˆxh(x) + (1− pˆx)Ex
(
ψpˆ(X1)
))
×
(
h(x)− Ex
(
ψpˆ(X1)
))
| ≥ 0.
(3.3)
• Suppose g in (1) is twice differentiable. Then, a necessary condition for a stopping
strategy pˆ to be an equilibrium is that for each x ∈ E with pˆx ∈ (0, 1) (if such points
exist) holds that,
g′′
(
pˆxh(x) + (1− pˆx)Ex
(
ψpˆ(X1)
))
≤ 0.
Proof. Inequalities (3.1) and (3.1) are obtained by setting q = 1 and q = 0 in (EqII),
respectively. Inequality (3.1) is trivial. If none of (3.1)–(3.1) holds with equality then pˆx
cannot satisfy (EqIV); to see this use e.g. that (3.1) is essentially a first order condition
for the maximization in (EqIV). Hence, the first result holds. The second result is proved
similarly; it is essentially a second order condition for the maximization in (EqIV).
7
We now provide an equilibrium verification theorem.
Definition 3.2. Two functions φ : E → R and ψ : E → R are said to be a solution to
the characterizing equation if, for all x ∈ E,
φ(x) + g (ψ(x))
= max
q∈[0,1]
{qf(x) + (1− q)Ex (φ(X1)) + g (qh(x) + (1− q)Ex (ψ(X1)))} , (3.4)
φ(x) = qˆxf(x) + (1− qˆx)Ex (φ(X1)) , and
ψ(x) = qˆxh(x) + (1− qˆx)Ex (ψ(X1))
where qˆx is the maximal constant in the set of maximizers in (3.2). (3.5)
Theorem 3.3 (Verification). Suppose two functions φ and ψ constitute a solution to the
characterizing equation. Then, any vector qˆ = (qˆx)x∈E , with qˆx defined in (3.2), is an
equilibrium whose equilibrium value function is given by
Jqˆ(x) = φ(x) + g (ψ(x)) .
Proof. Note that if x is an absorbing state then the expression to be maximized in (3.2)
is independent of q and hence qˆx = 1. The result follows directy from Lemma A.3 and
Proposition 2.9.
In the rest of this section we suppose g in (1) is either convex or concave. We remark
that the mean-variance problem studied in Section 6.1 uses a convex g while the variance
problem studied in Section 6.2 uses a concave g.
Corollary 3.4. Suppose g in (1) is convex. Then, a stopping strategy pˆ is an equilibrium
if and only if, for each x ∈ E, (3.1) and (3.1) hold and (at least) one of them holds with
equality.
Proof. If, for each x, the necessary conditions (3.1) and (3.1) hold and one of them holds
with equality then pˆ is a equilibrium since (EqIII) is then satisfied, for each x, with q = 0
or q = 1; to see this use that convexity of g implies (Lemma A.4) that
q 7→ K(x, q, pˆ) is convex, (3.6)
and that it generally holds (Lemma A.1) that
φp(x) + g
(
ψp(x)
)
= K(x,px,p), for any p and x. (3.7)
Let us show the reverse implication: If pˆ is an equilibrium then trivially (3.1) and (3.1)
hold. Moreover, by (3) holds that the maximum in (EqIII) is attained by either q = 0 or
q = 1. Recall that if pˆ is an equilibrium then (EqIII) holds. Now note that (i) if q = 0 is
the maximizer in (EqIII) then (3.1) holds with equality, and (ii) if q = 1 is the maximizer
in (EqIII) then (3.1) holds equality.
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Corollary 3.5. Suppose g in (1) is concave and differentiable. Then,
• pˆ is an equilibrium if and only if, for each x ∈ E, (3.1), (3.1) and (3.1) hold and (at
least) one of them holds with equality,
• if, for a stopping strategy pˆ, (3.1) holds with equality for each x ∈ E, then pˆ is an
equilibrium.
Proof. Let us prove the first result: Theorem 3.1 implies that if pˆ is an equilibrium then,
for each x ∈ E, (3.1), (3.1) and (3.1) hold and (at least) one of them holds with equality.
To see that the other implication is true use concavity of q 7→ K(x, q, pˆ) (Lemma A.4)
and basic optimization theory to see that if, for each x ∈ E, (3.1), (3.1) and (3.1) hold and
(at least) one of them holds with equality then the equilibrium condition (EqIII) must be
satisfied (use also the general observation (3)). The second results is proved similarly.
Definition 3.6. For an equilibrium pˆ we denote by Pˆ the set of equivalent equilibria
defined as the set of vectors p ∈ [0, 1]N such that p is an equilibrium satisfying Jp(x) =
Jpˆ(x) for each x ∈ E.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose g in (1) is strictly convex and an equilibrium pˆ exists. Then, an
equivalent pure equilibrium exists and such a pure equilibrium can be obtained by changing
each pˆx ∈ (0, 1) (in case they exist) to 1.
Proof. Suppose y ∈ E is such that pˆy ∈ (0, 1). Then
q 7→ K(y, q, pˆ)
(
= qf(y) + (1− q)Ey
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
+ g
(
qh(y) + (1− q)Ey
(
ψpˆ(X1)
)))
has a maximum at q = pˆy . Since this function is convex (Lemma A.4) and has an inte-
rior maximum (by definition of equilibrium and since pˆy ∈ (0, 1)) it must be a constant
function. In particular, using that g is strictly convex and that
q 7→ qf(y) + (1− q)Ey
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
is linear, we find that
q 7→ qh(y) + (1− q)Ey
(
ψpˆ(X1)
)
is constant i.e. h(y) = Ey
(
ψpˆ(X1)
)
, but then it also follows that f(y) = Ey
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
.
Now write
p˜x =
{
pˆx, x 6= y
1, x = y.
Fix a state x ∈ E. Clearly, τp˜ ≤ τpˆ a.s. Using the above and the Markov property we
obtain
Ex(f(Xτpˆ)) = Ex
(
f(Xτpˆ)I{τp˜=τpˆ}
)
+ Ex
(
f(Xτpˆ)I{τp˜<τpˆ}
)
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= Ex
(
f(Xτpˆ)I{τp˜=τpˆ}
)
+ Ex
(
EXτp˜
(
EX1
(
f(Xτpˆ)
))
I{τp˜<τpˆ}
)
= Ex
(
f(Xτpˆ)I{τp˜=τpˆ}
)
+ Ex
(
Ey
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
I{τp˜<τpˆ}
)
= Ex
(
f(Xτpˆ)I{τp˜=τpˆ}
)
+ Ex
(
f(y)I{τp˜<τpˆ}
)
= Ex(f(Xτp˜)).
It can similarly be shown that
Ex(h(Xτpˆ)) = Ex(h(Xτp˜)).
It can now be directly verified that p˜ is an equilibrium. It it also easy to see that Jpˆ(x) =
Jp˜(x). Now, the claim holds by a trivial induction.
Remark 3.8. The previous theorem implies that in the strictly convex case we just have
to check at most the 2N pure strategies to check whether equilibria exist.
4. A fixed point problem characterization and existence
results
In this section we derive equilibrium existence results which rely on the observation that
an equilibrium is the solution to a certain fixed point problem.
Definition 4.1. Let Γ : [0, 1]N → 2[0,1]
N
be the point-to-set mapping taking vectors
p ∈ [0, 1]N as input and as output giving Γ(p) defined as the set of all vectors p∗ which,
for each x ∈ E, satisfy
p∗x ∈ argmax
q∈[0,1]
K(x, q,p). (4.1)
Proposition 4.2. A stopping strategy pˆ is an equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed point of
the mapping Γ, i.e. if and only if pˆ ∈ Γ(pˆ).
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.9.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose the set of maximizers in (4.1) is an interval for each p ∈ [0, 1]N and
x ∈ E. Then the mapping Γ has a fixed point and an equilibrium exists.
Proof. The assumed convexity for the set of maximizers for each particular x in (4.1)
implies that Γ(p) will be a hyperrectangle and thus a convex set. Since a maximizer in
(4.1) necessarily exists follows that Γ(p) is non-empty. To summarize:
Γ(p) is a convex and non-empty set. (4.2)
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Suppose {kp} is a sequence of vectors in [0, 1]
N with limk→∞ kp = p. From Lemma A.2
we know that
lim
k→∞
Ex
(
φ
kp(X1)
)
= Ex
(
φp(X1)
)
, for each x ∈ E.
Using the analogous result for ψp and Assumption 2.7 we find that for any fixed q and x
it holds that
lim
k→∞
K(x, q, kp) = K(x, q,p).
Hence, using also that q 7→ K(x, q,p) is continous (for any fixed x and p), it is easy to
see that:
For any two sequences {kp} and {kq} on [0, 1]
N , with limn→∞ kp = p
and limn→∞ kq = q, that satisfy kq ∈ Γ(kp) for all k, holds q ∈ Γ(p).
(4.3)
We also note that:
The set [0, 1]N is non-empty, compact and convex. (4.4)
From (4),(4) and (4) follow that we may use Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, see e.g. [23,
p. 121], to conclude that the mapping Γ has a fixed point. The existence of an equilibrium
follows (using also Proposition 4.2).
Corollary 4.4. Suppose g in (1) is concave, then an equilibrium exists.
Proof. The concavity of g implies the concavity of q 7→ K(x, q,p), see Lemma A.4. It
directly follows that the set of maximizers in (4.1) is an interval for each p ∈ [0, 1]N and
x ∈ E. The result follows from Theorem 4.3.
Remark 4.5. In [31] time-inconsistent regular stochastic control in continuous time is
studied and an equilibrium existence result is proved using fixed point arguments similar
to those used here. In [8] time-inconsistent stochastic control in discrete time is studied
and it is noted that an equilibriumcan be viewed as the fixed point of a particularmapping.
5. The myopic adjustment process and equilibrium stability
An iteration of the typepk+1 ∈ Γ(pk)where p0 ∈ [0, 1]
N (see Definition 4.1) corresponds
to what in economics is known as a myopic adjustment process for decisions in repeated
interactive situations, see e.g. [10, 22, 34]. The interpretation here is that every agent in
the game adjusts his decision at each k-step under the (myopic) assumption that all other
agents will stay with their strategy. Since Γ(pk) is in general a set of vectors, i.e. a set
of stopping strategies, it holds that this iteration is not uniquely defined. We thus define
Γ¯(pk) as the largest (in Euclidean norm, or, equivalently, element-wise) vector in Γ(pk)
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and consider the myopic adjustment process
pk+1 = Γ¯(pk), with p0 ∈ [0, 1]
N . (5.1)
This corresponds to the interpretation that there is preference in the myopic adjustment
for a higher probability of stopping over a smaller one when they give the same value
(in the maximization in (4.1)). Note that the myopic adjustment process can be tried as a
constructive algorithm for finding equilibria.
The following are now natural questions:
1. Suppose pˆ is an equilibrium and that we perturb pˆ slightly by considering a stopping
strategy pˆǫ ∈ B(pˆ; ǫ) for some small ǫ > 0, where B(pˆ; ǫ) denotes a ball with radius ǫ
centered at pˆ. In which circumstances does then the myopic adjustment process (5) with
p0 = pˆ
ǫ converge to pˆ?
2. In which circumstances does the myopic adjustment process (5) converge to an equi-
librium pˆ for any initial value p0?
In the rest of this section we try to shed some light on these questions by defining and
investigating different notions of equilibrium stability.
Definition 5.1. An equilibrium pˆ is said to be strongly locally stable if there exists a
constant ǫ such that for every pˆǫ ∈ B(pˆ; ǫ) there exists an equivalent equilibrium p ∈ Pˆ
such that for every x it holds that
K(x,px, pˆ
ǫ) ≥ K(x, q, pˆǫ), for all q ∈ [0, 1].
Definition 5.2. An equilibrium pˆ is said to be locally stable if for some ǫ > 0 and every
pˆǫ ∈ B(pˆ; ǫ) the myopic adjustment process with p0 = pˆ
ǫ converges to an equivalent
equilibrium p ∈ Pˆ. An equilibrium is said to be unstable if it is not locally stable.
It is easy to see that a strongly locally stable equilibrium is locally stable.
Remark 5.3. The interpretation of a strongly locally stable equilibrium is that the best re-
sponse (at each x) to a small deviation from the equilibrium is to return to an equivalent
equilibrium immediately; i.e., if a small deviation from a strongly locally stable equilib-
rium occurs then the myopic adjustment process converges in one step to an equivalent
equilibrium. The interpretation of a locally stable equilibrium is that if a small devia-
tion from the equilibrium occurs then the equilibrium (or more precisely an equivalent
equilibrium) will eventually be restored under the myopic adjustment process.
We obtain:
Theorem 5.4. Suppose g is strictly convex and that an equilibrium pˆ exists. Then, pˆ is
strongly locally stable.
Proof. In this proof let us use the notation
p˜ = Γ¯(pˆǫ).
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Now, if we can show that p˜ is an equilibrium equivalent to pˆ for some small ǫ > 0 then
we are done.
Fix an arbitrary state x ∈ E. Since q 7→ K(x, q, pˆ) is a convex function it follows that
exactly one of the following cases holds:
Case 1: argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = {0}. This means that pˆx = 0 and K(x, 0, pˆ) >
K(x, q, pˆ) for all q ∈ (0, 1]. Now use thatK(x, q,p) is continuous in p (Lemma A.2), and
convex in q (Lemma A.4) to see that there exists an ǫ = ǫx > 0 such that
argmax
q∈[0,1]
K(x, q, pˆǫ) = {0},
i.e. p˜x = pˆx.
Case 2: argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = {1}. In the same way as above we find ǫ = ǫx > 0
such that p˜x = pˆx.
Case 3: argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = [0, 1]. This means that K(x, q1, pˆ) = K(x, q2, pˆ) for
all q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]. No matter how ǫ is chosen, convexity trivially implies that
p˜x ∈ {0, 1}.
Summarizing the three cases, for a sufficiently small ǫ we conclude that p˜ satisfies
p˜x =
{
pˆx, when argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = {0} or = {1},
1 or 0, when argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = [0, 1].
We now show that p˜ is an equilibrium equivalent to pˆ. Indeed, note that the condi-
tion argmaxq∈[0,1]K(x, q, pˆ) = [0, 1] means that q 7→ K(x, q, pˆ) is a constant func-
tion. Hence, using the exact same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, we see that
Jp˜ = Jpˆ, proving the claim.
Theorem 5.4 implies that the equilibria in the mean-variance problems studied in Section
6.1 below are locally stable.
Definition 5.5. An equilibrium pˆ is said to be globally stable if the myopic adjustment
process converges to an equivalent equilibrium p ∈ Pˆ for any starting value p0.
Obviously, a globally stable equilibrium is a unique equilibrium and a globally stable
equilibrium is also locally stable. However, a globally stable equilibrium is not gener-
ally strongly locally stable.
A strictly convex function g makes the problem of checking strong stability a finite prob-
lem as only pure stopping strategies have to be considered. With this notion, wemay ana-
lyze the structure using the notion of directed graphs: The vertices are the pure strategies
p ∈ {0, 1}N and there is a directed edge from p to q if q = Γ¯(p). Now, the problem of
studying strong stability boils down to checking whether this directed graph is acyclic.
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We remark that Example 6.2 is a problem with a convex g and two equilibria and hence
convexity of g is not a sufficient condition for global stability.
We immediately obtain the following (trivial) result:
Theorem 5.6. Suppose g is strictly convex. Then: Either the myopic procedure does not
converge but runs in cycles or it terminates in at most 2N + 1 steps.
6. Applications
In this sectionwe apply the developed theory tomean-variance and variance optimization
problems.
6.1. A mean-variance problem
The mean-variance stopping problem — see Section 1.1 for a motivation — is attained in
the framework of the present paper when
f(x) = −γx2, g(x) = x+ γx2 and h(x) = x, with γ > 0. (6.1)
The convexity of g implies that if an equilibrium exists then a pure version of that equi-
librium exists, cf. Theorem 3.7, and that it is moreover strongly locally stable, cf. Theorem
5.4.
6.1.1. Equilibrium strategies of threshold-type
In [15, Section 4.2] it was shown that the equilibrium for the mean-variance problem for a
geometric Brownian motion corresponds, in case it exists, to using a particular threshold
stopping strategy. In this section we first study a threshold strategy ansatz to find an
equilibrium stopping time for the mean-variance problem assuming only thatX is a skip
free Markov chain absorbed in x1 and xN on some state space E = {x1, x2, ..., xN}with
Pxi(X1 = xi+1) = 1/2 = Pxi(X1 = xi−1) for all i = 1, ..., N − 1. We furthermore
assume x1 = 0 (this makes some expressions shorter and can be easily relaxed). Second,
we use this ansatz to a more particular problem.
An (upper) threshold stopping time
τp = min{n ≥ 0 : Xn ≥ xb},
is easily seen to be attained by the stopping strategy
p =
(
1,px2 , ...,pxN−1 , 1
)T
, with pxi = 0 for i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1} and
pxi = 1 for i ∈ {b, ..., N − 1}.
(6.2)
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(Note that the values of px1 and pxN are irrelevant since x1 and xN are absorbing states.)
The convexity of g and Corollary 3.4 imply that p in (6.1.1) is an equilibrium if and only
if, for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
φp(xi) + g
(
ψp(xi)
)
≥ f(xi) + g(h(xi)),
φp(xi) + g
(
ψp(xi)
)
≥ Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
))
.
To see this note e.g. that p being pure implies that one of these conditions necessarily
holds. This implies that p in (6.1.1) is an equilibrium if and only:
Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
))
≥ f(xi) + g(h(xi)), for i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1}, (6.3)
f(xi) + g(h(xi)) ≥ Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
))
, for i ∈ {b, ..., N − 1}.(6.4)
To see this use the threshold structure of p and that x1 and xN are absorbing. Now
consider the function
H(xi, b) := Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
))
− f(xi)− g(h(xi)).
Since p in (6.1.1) is an equilibrium if and only if (6.1.1) and (6.1.1) hold it follows that
p in (6.1.1) is an equilibrium if and only if:
H(xi, b) ≥ 0, for i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1} and H(xi, b) ≤ 0, for i ∈ {b, ..., N − 1}.
(6.5)
Since x1 is absorbing it holds that
φp(xi) =
{
f(x1) + (f(xb)− f(x1))Pr(i, b), i ∈ {1, ..., b − 1}
f(xi), i ∈ {b, ..., N},
for Pr(i, b) := Pxi
(
Xmin{n≥0:Xn∈{x1,xb}} = xb
)
with X0 = xi ∈ {x1, ..., xb}; where
Pr(i, b) is determined by the recurrence relationPr(i, b) = 12Pr(i+1, b)+
1
2Pr(i−1, b)
for i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1} with boundary conditions Pr(1, b) = 0 and Pr(b, b) = 1, yielding
Pr(i, b) =
i− 1
b− 1
.
Basic probability calculations now yield
Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
=


f(x1), i = 1
1
2φp(xi+1) +
1
2φp(xi−1), i ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}
f(xN ) i = N
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=

f(x1) + (f(xb)− f(x1))
i−1
b−1 , i ∈ {1, ..., b − 1}
1
2f(xb+1) +
1
2(f(x1) + (f(xb)− f(x1))
b−2
b−1 , i = b
1
2f(xi+1) +
1
2f(xi−1), i ∈ {b+ 1, ..., N − 1}
f(xN ), i = N.
Using (6.1) and x1 = 0 this implies that
Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
=


−γx2b
i−1
b−1 , i ∈ {1, ..., b − 1}
−12γx
2
b+1 −
1
2γx
2
b
b−2
b−1 , i = b
−12γx
2
i+1 −
1
2γx
2
i−1, i ∈ {b+ 1, ..., N − 1}
−γx2N , i = N.
Analogously,
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
)
=


xb
i−1
b−1 , i ∈ {1, ..., b − 1}
1
2xb+1 +
1
2xb
b−2
b−1 , i = b
1
2xi+1 +
1
2xi−1, i ∈ {b+ 1, ..., N − 1}
xN , i = N.
Note also that −f(xi) − g(h(xi)) = −xi. The observations above yield, with some
calculations
H(xi, b) =


xb
i−1
b−1
(
1− γxb
(
1− i−1
b−1
))
− xi, i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1}
xb+1(1−γxb+1)
2 +
xb(1−γxb)
2
b−2
b−1 + γ
(xb+1+xb b−2b−1)
2
4 − xb, i = b
xi+1+xi−1
2 −
γ
4 (xi+1 − xi−1)
2 − xi, i ∈ {b+ 1, ..., N − 1}.
Using this explicit formula we can — for any N , γ and further specification of the state
space E — check if (6.1.1) is satisfied for some bˆ ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}, in which case this bˆ
corresponds to an equilibrium. Moreover, if such a bˆ exists then the observations above
imply that the corresponding equilibrium value function is
Jpˆ(xi) = φpˆ(xi) + g(ψpˆ(xi)) =


x1 = 0, i = 1
H(xi, bˆ) + xi i ∈ {2, ..., b − 1}
xi i ∈ {b, ..., N},
where pˆ denotes the threshold strategy, cf. (6.1.1), corresponding to bˆ.
Let us now consider a specific example. Suppose γ = 0.07 and that
E = {x1, x2, ..., xN}, with x1 = 0, xi+1 − xi = i/10 and N = 18. (6.6)
The state space E is depicted in Figure 1. For this example we conclude from (6.1.1) and
the second picture in Figure 1 that the threshold strategy (6.1.1) with b = bˆ = 16 is an
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Figure 1 First picture: A representation of the state space defined in (6.1.1) withN = 18. Second
picture: i 7→ H(xi, b) for b = 16. Third picture: the equilibrium value function xi 7→
Jpˆ(xi) (dots) and xi 7→ xi (dashed).
equilibrium. Figure 1 also depicts the corresponding equilibrium value function together
with the value for the strategy of always stopping immediately.
Remark 6.1. The equilibrium value function in Figure 1 looks very similar to the equilib-
rium value function for the geometric Brownian motionmean-variance stopping problem
depicted in [15, Figure 2].
6.1.2. Counterexamples to uniqueness and existence
In this section we show that one should not in general expect an equilibrium to be unique,
not only in the trivial sense that more than one equilibrium strategy may exist, but also
in the sense that these may correspond to different equilibrium value functions. We also
show that one should not in general expect an equilibrium to exist.
Example 6.2 (Two different equilibria). Consider the mean-variance problem — i.e. f, g
and h as defined in (6.1) — for some γ > 2 and the Markov chainX defined by:
x1 = 1 x2 = 2
1/2
1/2
Let us show that pˆ = (1, 1)T , i.e. the strategy corresponding to always stopping im-
mediately, is an equilibrium. Clearly, φpˆ(xi) + g(ψpˆ(xi)) = f(xi) + g(h(xi)) = xi
for each i. Hence (3.1) holds with equality for each i. Simple calculations give that
Ex1
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
= −γ2
(
22 + 12
)
= −52γ and Ex1
(
ψpˆ(X1)
)
= 32 . Hence,
Ex1
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
+ g
(
Ex1
(
ψpˆ(X1)
))
=
6− γ
4
< 1 = f(x1) + g(h(x1)).
Hence, (3.1) holds for i = 1. Moreover, (3.1) holds also for x2 since this is an absorbing
state. It thus follows from Corollary 3.4 that pˆ is an equilibrium. The corresponding
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equilibrium value is easily found to be Jpˆ = (1, 2)
T . With similar calculations it can be
shown that also p˜ = (0, 1)T , i.e. waiting until the value 2 is reached, is an equilibrium
with corresponding equilibrium value function Jp˜ = (2, 2)
T .
Example 6.3 (No equilibrium). Consider the mean-variance problem with γ = 1 for the
skip free Markov chainX defined by:
x1 = 0.39 x2 = 0.52 x3 = 0.70 x4 = 0.97
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
Since g is convex— implying that if an equilibriumexists then a pure equilibriumexists, cf.
Theorem 3.7 — and x1 and xN are absorbing it follows that verifying that the strategies (i)
– (iv) below are not equilibrium strategies corresponds to verifying that this problem has
no equilibrium. From the calculations below and the convexity of g it is easy to see that a
myopic adjustment process for this problem does not converge but instead — regardless
of the initial value p0 — runs in a cycle according to (i) → (ii) → (iii) → (iv) → (i)
and so on as long as it is allowed to run.
(i) p = (1, 1, 1, 1)T : First, φp(x2) + g(ψp(x2)) = f(x2) + g(h(x2)) = x2 = 0.52.
Second, Ex2
(
φp(X1)
)
= 12f(x1) +
1
2f(x3) ≈ −0.3211 and Ex2
(
ψp(X1)
)
=
1
2h(x1) +
1
2h(x3) ≈ 0.5450; which gives Ex2
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Ex2
(
ψp(X1)
))
≈
0.5210. Hence, deviating by not stopping is optimal at x = 2 and this is therefore
not an equilibrium (cf. e.g. Theorem 3.1).
(ii) p = (1, 0, 1, 1)T : First, φp(x3) + g(ψp(x3)) = f(x3) + g(h(x3)) = x3 =
0.70. Second, Ex3
(
φp(X1)
)
= 12f(x4) +
1
2
(
1
2f(x1) +
1
2f(x3)
)
≈ −0.6310
and Ex3
(
ψp(X1)
)
= 12h(x4) +
1
2
(
1
2h(x1) +
1
2h(x3)
)
≈ 0.7575; which gives
Ex3
(
φp(X1)
)
+ g
(
Ex2
(
ψp(X1)
))
≈ 0.7003. Hence, this is not an equilibrium.
(iii) p = (1, 0, 0, 1)T : First, φp(x2) = Pr(2, 4)f(x4)+(1−Pr(2, 4))f(x1) ≈ −0.4150
(where Pr(2, 4) = 13 , cf. Section 6.1.1) and ψp(x2) = Pr(2, 4)h(x4) + (1 −
Pr(2, 4))h(x1) ≈ 0.5833. Hence, φp(x2) + g(ψp(x2)) ≈ 0.5086. Second, f(x2) +
g(h(x2)) = x2 = 0.52. Hence, this is not an equilibrium.
(iv) p = (1, 1, 0, 1)T : First, φp(x3) =
1
2f(x2) +
1
2f(x4) ≈ −0.6057 and ψp(x3) =
1
2h(x2)+
1
2h(x4) ≈ 0.7450. Hence, φp(x3)+g(ψp(x3)) ≈ 0.6944. Second, f(x3)+
g(h(x3)) = x3 = 0.70. Hence, this is not an equilibrium.
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6.2. A variance problem
The variance problem is defined by setting Jτ (Xτ ) = Varx(Xτ ) in (1) which in our frame-
work is attained when
f(x) := x2, g(x) = −x2 and h(x) = x. (6.7)
The equilibrium approach to the variance stopping problem for a geometric Brownian
motion was studied in [15, Section 4.1]. Optimal variance problems are also studied in
e.g. [11, 12, 24, 25, 40].
From Corollary 4.4 and the concavity of g follows that an equilibrium always exists for
the variance problem. Let us now consider a symmetric random walk X on the state
space
E = {x0, x1, ..., xM−1, xM} = {0, 1, ...,M − 1,M},
where x0 is absorbing and xM is reflecting, for some natural number M . Note that the
number of states is N = M + 1. Let us try the ansatz that the equilibrium is of the kind
p = (1, 0, ..., 0, p)T (6.8)
for some p ∈ [0, 1] to be determined. Similarly to Section 6.1 we find that
Pr(i) := Pxi
(
Xmin{n≥0:Xn∈{x0,xM}} = xM
)
=
i
M
.
Using that p is the probability of stopping at xM , and also (6.2), (6.2) and that x0 = 0 is
absorbing, we find
φp (xM ) = pM
2 + (1− p)Pr (M − 1)φp (xM ) .
This implies that
φp (xM ) =
pM2
1− (1− p)Pr (M − 1)
=
pM3
M − (1− p)(M − 1)
.
Since xM is reflecting it follows that
ExM
(
φp(X1)
)
= φp (xM−1) .
It is similarly found that
φp(xi) = Pr(i)φp (xM ) , for all i,
Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
= φp(xi), for all i 6= M .
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Putting everything together yields
φp(xi) =
ipM2
M − (1− p)(M − 1)
, for all i,
Exi
(
φp(X1)
)
=
{
ipM2
M−(1−p)(M−1) , i 6= M
(M−1)pM2
M−(1−p)(M−1) i = M.
Similar calculations yield
ψp(xi) =
ipM
M − (1− p)(M − 1)
, for all i,
Exi
(
ψp(X1)
)
=
{
ipM
M−(1−p)(M−1) , i 6= M
(M−1)pM
M−(1−p)(M−1) i = M.
Using the findings above it is easy to verify: (i) condition (3.1) is satisfied for all i and
all p (note that this corresponds to the fact that the variance is always non-negative), (ii)
condition (3.1) holds with equality for i 6= M , (iii) condition (3.1) holds with equality for
i = M if and only if p = 1
M+1 (the inequality in condition (3.1) is of course trivially
satisfied), and (iv) condition (3.1) holds for p = 1
M+1 and i = M . Hence, Corollary 3.5
implies that the strategy
pˆ =
(
1, 0, ..., 0,
1
M + 1
)T
, (6.9)
is an equilibrium. Simple calculations imply that (6.2) corresponds to
φpˆ(xi) =
iM
2
, for all i,
Exi
(
φpˆ(X1)
)
=
{
iM
2 , i 6= M
(M−1)M
2 i = M,
ψpˆ(xi) =
i
2
, for all i,
Exi
(
ψpˆ(X1)
)
=
{
i
2 , i 6= M
M−1
2 i = M.
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Figure 2 The equilibrium value function xi 7→ Jpˆ(xi) forM = 100.
The corresponding equilibrium value function is
Jpˆ(xi) =
iM
2
−
(
i
2
)2
, for all i.
The equilibrium value function in the caseM = 100 is depicted in Figure 2.
We remark that formixed equilibria one should not in general expect equilibriumstability.
This can bemade rigorous in this example: If we consider pˆǫ by just changing pˆM to pˆ
ǫ
M =
1
M+1 + ǫ, the myopic adjustment process can be found explicitly using the calculations
above. Indeed, for small enough ǫ, it holds that
Γ¯(pˆǫ)x =
{
pˆx, x 6= M,
pˆM −
(M−1)
2 ǫ, x = M.
Therefore, in case M ≥ 3, iterating this, we see that the myopic adjustment process
cannot converge to the fixed point pˆ. Hence pˆ is not locally stable.
7. Discussion and relation to the literature
The definitions of pure and mixed strategies as well as the equilibrium definition of the
present paper are in linewith the definitions of [4] which studiesmean-standard deviation
and mean-variance stopping in a discrete time framework. A pure stopping strategy for
continous time is in [13, 15] defined as the entry time into a set in the state space. The
stopping strategies considered in [28, 29, 30, 33] are of the same type. Noticing that a pure
stopping strategy p corresponds to
τp = min{n ≥ 0 : Xn ∈ {x ∈ E : px = 1}},
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we see that our definition is in line with the literature. A mixed stopping strategy for con-
tinuous time is in [15] defined as the first stopping time of anX-associated Cox process,
which is a natural continous time interpretation of the definition of a mixed stopping
strategy in the present paper; see [15, Section 2.1] for further arguments. The continuous
time mixed equilibrium in [15] corresponds to a first order condition whose interpreta-
tion is inline with the present paper in the sense that a stopping strategy is an equilibrium
if it is at no x desirable to deviate from the equilibrium by using an alternative probabil-
ity for stopping at x. The equilibrium definition in [13] is analogous but in a framework
considering only pure strategies. Further comparisons of definitions in the literature on
time-inconsistent stopping is found in e.g. [13, 15].
In [33] a non-exponential discounting stopping problem in discrete time for stopping
strategies that correspond to pure strategies in the sense of the present paper is studied
and a method for finding equilibria similar to the myopic adjustment process, there called
a fixed-point iteration, is used to establish equilibrium existence. The equilibrium defi-
nition of [33] differs from that of the present paper in the sense that it is not possible to
deviate at x from a proposed equilibrium stopping strategy if it suggest stopping at x, and
hence the strategy of always stopping immediately is necessarily an equilibrium , see also
the discussion in [15, Section 2.1]. Similar frameworks and approaches to finding equilib-
ria for time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time is studied in [28, 29, 30].
We also note that a similar iteration approach is used to finding equilibria for a portfolio
selection problem in [17, Example 4.].
A. Technical results
In this section we derive properties for the function φp defined in (2). Analogous results
are of course true for ψp defined in (2).
Lemma A.1. For each p and x holds that,
φp(x) = pxf(x) + (1− px)Ex
(
φp(X1)
)
.
Proof. Follows from the definitions of p and τp.
Lemma A.2. For each p and x, the following identities hold:
φp(x) = Ex

I{τp<∞}∑
i∈N0
i∏
j=1
(1− pXj−1)pXif(Xi) + I{τp=∞} limn→∞
f(Xn)

 ,
Ex
(
φp(X1)
)
= Ex

I{τp<∞}∑
i∈N
i∏
j=2
(1− pXj−1)pXif(Xi) + I{τp=∞} limn→∞
f(Xn)

 ,
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where we use the convention
∏l
j=k := 1 for l < k. Moreover, the functions
p ∈ [0, 1]N 7→ φp(x), p ∈ [0, 1]
N 7→ Ex
(
φp(X1)
)
are, for each fixed x ∈ E, continuous.
Proof. Using the notation (2), Fubini’s Theorem and Assumption 2.8 we immediately ob-
tain the identities. Recall that φp is independent of the choice of px for each absorbing
state x ∈ E. The continuity follows from majorized convergence.
Lemma A.3. Consider a function φ : E → R and a vector p ∈ [0, 1]N with px > 0 for
each absorbing state x ∈ E and suppose
φ(x) = pxf(x) + (1− px)Ex (φ(X1)) , for each x ∈ E, (A.1)
then
φ(x) = φp(x), for each x ∈ E.
Proof. Note that τp < ∞ a.s. Repeated substitution in (A.3) and the Markov property
give, with a slight abuse of notation,
φ(x) = pxf(x) + (1− px)Ex (φ(X1))
= Ex

∑
i∈N0
i∏
j=1
(1− pXj−1)pXif(Xi)

 .
Now use Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.4. If g : R→ R is a convex function then
q 7→ (c1q + c2(1− q) + g(c3q + c4(1− q))
is a convex function, for any constants c1, ..., c4 . The analogous result holds in the case g is
concave.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition convexity/concavity.
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